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ABSTRACT 
WHICH FINANCING MODEL IS RIGHT FOR HOTEL PROPERTIES? 
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF FINANCING MODELS HIGHLIGHTING THE 
PRACTICE AND EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT FINANCING MODELS ADOPTED BY 
HOTEL INDUSTRIES IN USA AND SINGAPORE   
 
By 
 
Goh Keng Tiong, Christopher 
Dr. Zheng Gu, Committee Chair 
Professor, Tourism and Convention Department 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
The high debt-financing model adopted by hotel owners in United States 
had contributed to a large number of foreclosures during the economic 
downturn. In contrast, the conservative financing model adopted by hotel 
owners in Singapore had sheltered them through the past recessions. Cultural 
values may have influenced the types of financing model adopted by hotel 
owners. Americans have a value system of using borrowed money to invest, 
while Singaporeans have a value system of saving for rainy days and spending 
within one’s means.   
The studies concluded that hotel owners in the United States and Singapore 
should consider Juglar’s nine to eleven year business cycle as reference (Juglar, 
n.d.), and adopt a financing model that undertakes an appropriate level of debt at 
early stage of economic upturns and when the hotel properties are increasingly 
enjoying high profitability. At the peak of economic upturns, hotel owners should 
revert to conservative financing model in preparation for potential economic 
downturns. As hotel business is a high-risk industry, a Quick Ratio of at least 1.5, 
and Interest Coverage of at least two must be maintained all the time. 
   iii 
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PART ONE 
Introduction 
In 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported the rise in hotel forfeitures being 
the greatest in United States since the early 1990’s (Hudson, 2009). Distressed 
“non-casino” hotel loans comprised of more than 1,000 properties and 
delinquencies of loans on casino-hotel added another 31 properties into the 
stable of hotel loan delinquency (Hudson, 2009). The late repayment of loan 
from the hotel industry has exceeded that of multi-family, with a total volume of 
$3 billion (Drummer, 2009). Fitch reported that hotel has become the leading 
property type with the biggest percentage of commercial-backed mortgage 
securities (CMBS) delinquencies of 5.83% (Drummer, 2009). The amount of 
delinquencies of loans on hotel properties is a worrying trend, as it mirrored the 
last catastrophic decline of property market in the early 1990s that saw some 
2,000 hotels’ bankruptcy filings in America (Butler, 2009).  
During the latest economic boom, many hotel owners went on acquisition 
sprees that left their properties loaded with debt (Hudson, 2009). The price of 
hotel properties went through the roof from 2005 to 2008 as property owners 
went on aggressive buying sprees that resulted in an enormous amount of 
mortgage debt (Hudson, 2009). The USA Today reported that the United States’ 
hotel industry was seeing more foreclosures or bankruptcies in 2009 as owners 
increasingly failed to repay maturing loans or they were falling behind payments 
(Yu, 2009). 
During the recession in the late 1990s, instead of being forced into 
foreclosure, a few hotels in Singapore were converted into luxury condominiums 
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or sold for redevelopment (Rahiwala, 2002). To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, the number of foreclosure of gazette hotels in Singapore since 1990s 
was insignificant, with only one hotel, Katong Park reported in 1998 (Rahiwala, 
1998) and another hotel, Asia Radio Hotel reported in 2002 (Tan, 2002). The last 
reported foreclosure of hotel in Singapore was the former Crown Prince hotel in 
2005 (Jones Lang LaSalle Hotels, 2005). The failure of Crown Prince hotel was 
not due to the failure of hotel operations, but the failure of non-hotel related 
businesses owned by the hotel owner. In fact, the Crown Prince hotel was sold at 
a profit to another hotel operator. The insolvency rate of hotel properties in 
Singapore was in great contrast with that of hotel properties in US. 
Purpose 
The decline of the property market in the early 1990s saw some 2,000 
hotels’ bankruptcy filings in the US (Butler, 2009). The recent financial crisis saw 
the rise of distressed hotel loan bankruptcies and restructurings. In 2009, 
Extended Stay Hotels, a 680-property chain hotel in the US filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection pending legal battle over its debt restructuring (Elowitt, 
2009). Another hotel, the Staten Island Hotel also filed for bankruptcy due to 
credit crunch (O'Shea, 2009). The hotel loan bankruptcy in the US appeared to be 
unacceptably high during recessions, and this phenomenon has been repeated 
during each economic downturn. Loan delinquency has been the cause of major 
failures in the hotel business. As a result, the need to identify the right financing 
model for hotel industries has become more apparent. The purpose of the 
professional paper is to identify the right financing model for hotel properties 
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that can minimize the risk of insolvency throughout the economic cycle and to 
maximize profits during economic upturns.  
The objectives of the professional paper are to study the financing models 
of hotel industries in the US and in Singapore; to identify the positive effects and 
negative effects of the two financing models based on the variables suggested by 
a study to predict Korean lodging firm failure (Youn & Gu, 2009); to identify the 
cultural differences that influence the financing models adopted by hotel owners 
in the US and Singapore; and to recommend the right financing model for hotel 
owners in the US and Singapore. Historical data was collected and used to 
perform ratio analysis for hotel industries in the US and Singapore. The results of 
the ratio analysis were examined to identify the positive effects and negative 
effects of the two financing models, based on the variables suggested by a study 
to predict Korean lodging firm failure (Youn & Gu, 2009). The findings from the 
literature review and ratio analyses were used to develop a financing model for 
hotel industries that could enable solvency throughout the economic cycle and to 
maximize profits during economic upturns.  
Justification 
The professional paper would be of interest to property owners and hotel 
management to identify the right financing model for their hotel properties, and 
to look out for warning signals that the hotels may be heading for business 
failures caused by debt and loan delinquency. Investors and bankers would also 
be keen to identify the financial risks of hotel properties for the purpose of 
investment and provision of credit facilities.  
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Constraints 
The financial data for the hotel industry in Singapore were limited to hotel 
operations. Data such as investment, debt and interest expenses were 
proprietary information available to property owners only. As such, publicly 
available information from public companies that have substantial businesses in 
the hotel and resort industry were used as samples to represent the hotel 
industry in Singapore. The long-term debt incurred by these companies may not 
be entirely due to hotel business, but includes residential, commercial and 
industrial development as well. The lack of reports on mortgage issues relating 
to Singapore’s hotel properties may be due to the lack of hotel delinquency and 
foreclosure incidents in Singapore.  
Glossary  
Bankruptcy. 
 Under US federal law, corporate bankruptcy can be filed under Chapter 11 
to enable the companies to recover from debt; or Chapter 7 when the companies 
run out of business (SEC, 2009). For Chapter 11 bankruptcy, companies still 
operate their businesses, and efforts are made to return the companies back to 
profitability, though some may end up liquidating. For Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
companies have to be liquidated, as they are so serious in debt that they can no 
longer continue with their business operations.   
Debt financing. 
It is a method of raising capital for companies by borrowing money from 
financial institutions, organizations and/or individuals by issuing bills, bonds or 
notes (Investopedia, 2010a). 
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Debt ratio. 
It is a measurement of total liabilities over total assets. The ratio gives an 
indication on the amount of debt the company used to finance its asset 
(InvestorWords.com, n.d.). 
Delinquency. 
It is defined as non-payment of debt when it is due for payment (Princeton 
University, n.d.). 
Equity financing. 
It is a method of raising capital for companies by issuing stocks to investors 
(Investopedia, 2010b). 
Equity ratio.  
The ratio is defined as the owner’s equity over the total assets of the 
company, which represents the percentage of the assets that are financed by 
stockholders as compared to creditors (Wikipedia, 2010). 
Insolvency. 
 It is a situation when a company can no longer make loan repayment. 
Insolvency may occur even when the total assets are more than its total 
liabilities. As such, insolvency may or may not lead to corporate bankruptcy 
(Dictionary.com, 2010).  
Junk bond. 
It is a high-risk corporate bond that offers high yield to investors. Such 
bond normally has low rating that associates with risk (Answers.com, 2010). 
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Ratio analysis. 
It is a quantitative analysis tool used to study the financial performance of a 
company, in terms of liquidity, solvency, operation efficiency and profitability for 
the purpose of planning, prediction and investment (Investopedia, 2010c). 
RevPar. 
It represents revenue per available room, which is commonly used by hotel 
industry to measure the performance of the room operations. RevPar can be 
calculated by multiplying the hotel average daily room rate (ADR) by occupancy 
rate (Financial Times, 2009). 
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PART TWO 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
The hotel industry is considered a high-risk business by lenders and 
mortgage investors (Elgonemy, 2002). One major concern of hotel financing is 
the debt to equity ratio, as excessive debt increases the costs of finance that 
reverse the positive effects of leverage. According to Kwansa and Parsa (1991) 
quoted in a study by Gu and Gao (2000), loan default was found to be one of the 
events unique to the bankrupt companies. Hotels typically have high operating 
expenses in comparison to other types of property.  For example, in a hotel 
environment where the variable cost is 40% and the rest are fixed cost, every 1% 
of revenue lost only trims 0.4% of expenses (Mammoser, 2009).  At the same 
time, if revenue declines 20%, the net cash flow would generally drop 35% to 
40% (Fitch, 2009).  As such, during a recession, a decline in hotel revenues will 
seriously impact the solvency of hotel properties that incurred large amount of 
debt.  
Financing model used by hotel industry in United States. 
According to Upneja and Dalbor (2001), the reliance on debt financing by 
the hotel industry in the United States was significant. The 2010 total debt to 
equity ratio of the hotel industry in the United States was reported by Reuters as 
77.52%, which means the capital of the hotel properties in the United States was 
largely funded by debt instead of equity (See Table 1). The high debt-financing 
model adopted by hotel owners in the United States can be observed by the 
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relatively high delinquencies rate. According to Ishmael (2009), a report from 
Fitch indicated that the delinquencies rate in the United States had increased to 
two billion dollars per month. The new hotel delinquencies during that period 
included about $180 million by RRI Hotel; $90 million by Four Seasons San 
Francisco; and about $80 million by Crown Plaza Hotel at New Orleans (Ishmael, 
2009). In the United States, many hotels had problems restructuring their loans 
because they were bundled into commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), 
which merged numerous property payments into a single bond (Hudson, 2009). 
Since many mortgage investors bought the junk bonds, the property owners 
have virtually no way to negotiate for a new loan structure. In the first quarter of 
2010, California alone saw seventy-nine hotels went into foreclosures, an 
increase of about twenty-five percent (Pierceall, 2010). The high debt-financing 
model adopted by hotel owners in the United States had contributed to a 
relatively large number of foreclosures during the economic downturn.  
Table 1   
Financing Strength of Hotel Industry in US and Singapore 
Gearing Ratio 
 
US Hotel 
2010 
April 7 
SG Hotel 
2008 
Dec 31 
S&P 500 
2010 
April 7 
Quick Ratio 0.78 2.50 0.81 
Current Ratio 1.01 2.63 0.97 
LT Debt to Equity 57.30 0.38 141.48 
Total Debt to Equity 77.52 0.76 202.73 
Interest Coverage 0.64 14.06 10.33 
Note: Data source from http://www.reuters.com and Thomson Reuters. 
Negative effects. 
The main disadvantage of debt financing is the need for hotel properties to 
produce sufficient cash flow to cover the interest payment. During an economic 
downturn or in a saturated market, hotel properties may not be able to generate 
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enough operating income to repay interest expenses. According to Gu and Gao 
(2000), unprofitable companies burdened with debt and short-term liabilities 
have the higher probability of bankruptcy. Hotel properties with large amount of 
debt faced the risk of insolvency and financial rigidness (Elgonemy, 2002). 
According to Elgonemy (2002), debt financing could enslave the hotel owner to 
the mortgagees, and restrict their ability to practice flexibility and creativity. The 
major negative effect of an aggressive financing model adopted by hotel owners 
in the United States could be seen by the unprecedented delinquency rate during 
the economic downturn. In September 2009 alone, the amount of default in 
hotels was 240, and the amount of foreclosures was 40 (Lewis, 2009).  
According to a Fitch Ratings report on delinquency index in the United 
States, hotel scored the highest delinquency rate of 16.61% among the property 
types (See Table 2). The findings may be due to the relatively larger debt 
incurred by hotel properties and higher default risk due to high volatility of 
income caused by fluctuation of demand in room occupancy. As indicated in 
Table 3, a total of ten large and public hotel companies in the United States filed 
for bankruptcy in 1989 to 2009 (LoPucki, 2010). The category for large hotel 
properties is one that has more than $100 million assets filed with the Securities 
Exchange Commission before filing for bankruptcy (LoPucki, 2010). For a hotel 
property to be considered as public, the company must maintain public in the 
three years prior to bankruptcy, and did not become private more than one year 
prior to bankruptcy (LoPucki, 2010). Although the number of large and public 
hotel companies that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy from 1989 to 2009 was 
only ten, the size of the hotel companies were significant. It is important to note 
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that Table 3 excluded hotels that were privately owned or less than $100 million 
in assets.  
Table 2 
Delinquency Rates by Property Type in February 2010  
Property Types Delinquency Rate (%) 
Office 3.50 
Hotel 16.61 
Retail 5.09 
Industrial 4.16 
Note: Source from http://www.businesswire.com (Business Wire, 2009). 
   
Table 3 
Large and Public Hotels Bankruptcy Chapter 11 Filings 
Year filed Corporation Name 
1989  Resorts International Inc. (1989)  
1990  Prime Motor Inns Inc.  
1991  Days Inns of America Inc.  
1991  Divi Hotels, N.V.  
1991  Trump Taj Mahal Funding Inc.  
1992  Trump Plaza Funding Inc.  
1994  Resorts International Inc. (1994)  
2001  Lodgian, Inc.  
2004  Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Inc.  
2009  Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. (2009)  
Note: Source was obtained from Lynn M. LoPucki Bankruptcy 
Research Database (2010). 
 
Research has shown that the number of bank foreclosures of hotels in the 
United States was expected to rise in 2010; many hotels have been struggling 
from huge debts as of December 2009 (Hanz, 2010). The overcapacity of the US 
lodging industry, coupled with the 1990 to 1991 economic downturn had 
bankrupted two-thirds of the United States’ hotels (Romeo, 1997; Gu & Gao, 
2000). The Gu and Gao (2000) study suggested that in the US hospitality 
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industry, unprofitable companies burdened with debt and short-term liabilities 
have a higher probability of bankruptcy. The study also suggested that fast 
expansion and sales growth of these companies could increase their bankruptcy 
likelihood, while profitable companies with less debt and short-term debt and 
slow sales growth have a lower risk of bankruptcy (Gu & Gao, 2000). According 
to a study by Campello (2006), to establish whether debt increases or decreases 
a firm's product market performance, it was found that a small amount of debt 
was related to a gain in the company’s sales, relative to the sales of its 
competitor; while a large amount of debt would lead to low product market 
performance.  
Positive effects. 
Debt financing has the advantage of rising capital for hotel owners, who 
were unwilling to forgo part of the ownership of the company, through the 
equity channel. Debt financing allows hotel owners to retain 100% ownership of 
the company. According to Elgonmy (2002), the use of a small amount of cash in 
addition to debt financing has the leverage effect of increasing the return on 
equity (ROE) for hotel property investment. For example, a debt financing of 
70% equity can improve the hotel property return on equity (ROE) from 10% to 
15.8% (Table 4). Debt financing produces best positive effect when the values of 
property appreciate faster than the amount of interest incurred on borrowed 
money. Looking positively, debt financing has the positive effect of forcing the 
management of the hotel to reduce operating cost and improve efficiency; 
otherwise the interest expenses would eat up the earnings if the hotel net 
operating income declines (Elgonemy, 2002).  
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Table 4 
Effect of Debt Financing on ROE 
 Without Leverage With 70% Leverage 
Equity contributions $100,000,000 $30,000,000 
Total revenues $30,000,000 $30,000,000 
Total fixed and operating expenses $20,000,000 $20,000,000 
Interest expenses 0 $5,250,000 
Net income to owner $10,000,000 $4,750,000 
Return on Equity (ROE) 10% 15.8% 
Note: Assume interest rate 7.5% per year. 
 
Although more long-term borrowings increase the company risk of 
insolvency, a study by Gu and Gao (2000) suggested that long-term debt 
enhances short-term liquidity, which reduces the probability of default caused 
by short-term liabilities. The argument was that more long-term debt could 
provide liquidity coverage for hotel owners to prevent potential foreclosures. 
The study has also shown that profitable companies with more long-term debt 
was less likely to encounter business failures compared to unprofitable 
companies with heavy burdens of current liabilities, which are likely to go into 
bankruptcy (Gu & Gao, 2000). 
Financing model used by hotel industry in Singapore. 
Generally, the financing model adopted by hotel property owners in 
Singapore was prudent and conservative. To illustrate the conservative financing 
approach, Bonvest Holdings that owns Sheraton Towers Singapore and The 
Residence Resorts has reduced its Debt to Equity ratio from 0.46 in 2004 to 0.23 
in 2005, 0.08 in 2006, 0.03 in 2007 and 0.01 in 2008 despite the expansion to 
Zanzibar and Maldives (Bonvest, 2009). Bonvest Holdings was in a net cash 
position and had funded the constructions of The Residence Resorts in Zanzibar 
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and Maldives through cash and recurring cash flows, though the company has 
bank credit facilities for further expansion (Bonvest, 2009). Another example is 
Furama holdings, which owns Furama Riverfront Hotel and Furama City Center 
in Singapore. The company’s bank borrowings has reduced from $135 millions in 
2004 to $124 millions in 2005, $52 millions in 2006, $43 millions in 2007, and 
zero borrowing in 2008, despite putting $14 million annually from 2004 to 2008 
for investment (Furama, 2008). Both Bonvest and Furama have demonstrated 
the conservative financing policy adopted by hotel property owners in 
Singapore. 
The Hotel Grand Central, which owns hotels in Singapore, Malaysia, China, 
Australia and New Zealand, has increased its bank loans from S$76.7 million in 
2007 to S$87.6 million in 2008 to finance the hotel development in little India, 
Singapore (Hotel Grand Central, 2008). Although Hotel Grand Central was one of 
the few hotels in Singapore to grow the company through debt financing, the 
debt to equity ratio remained low at 0.17 in 2008 (Hotel Grand Central, 2008). 
The more aggressive financing approach adopted by Singapore’s hotel owner 
was Amara Holdings. The company’s bank borrowings as at December 31, 2008 
were S$196.4 million, a reduction from S$215.5 million as at December 31, 2007 
(Amara Holdings, 2008). However, the borrowings were primarily meant for 
property development instead of purely hotel related operations or expansion 
(Amara Holdings, 2008). The Amara has maintained a healthy cash position of 
S$27.3 million in FY2008 as compared to S$12.3 million in FY2007. According to 
Amara 2008 annual report, the hotel group would continue to be prudent in 
conserving cash reserves to navigate the current economic storm (Amara 
Holdings, 2008). 
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Hotel owners in Singapore preferred to leverage on company’s retained 
earnings for growth, or rely on equity market to raise fund instead of debt 
financing (See Table 5). Generally, raising funds through equity was less costly 
than debt financing. It may explain why Singapore hotel owners prefer equity 
than debt if there is a need to raise funds.  In debt financing, companies have to 
fulfill debt-servicing obligations, regardless of profitability or economic 
conditions. A corporate debt carries the burden of repayment on maturity in 
addition to external forces that may affect the risk on debt, such as financial 
crisis and economic downturns. Therefore, excessive debt financing is risky for 
hotel owners. In the case of equity, there is no obligation for dividend 
distribution, thus no risk of repayment. The financing model adopted by hotel 
property owners in Singapore was prudent and conservative.  
Table 5 
2008 Gearing Ratios and ROE of Hotel Industry in Singapore 
Hotel QR CR LTDE TDTE IC ROE 
Amara 1.47 1.48 0.89 1.46 3.42 6.80 
Banyan Tree 1.19 1.25 0.47 1.64 2.84 1.25 
Bonvests 2.09 2.22 0.00 0.27 72.50 7.82 
CDL 1.12 2.86 0.61 1.31 6.26 10.69 
Furama 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.12 70.50 14.88 
Genting 4.54 4.55 0.50 0.72 -2.28 -4.07 
Gluoculeisure 1.76 1.76 0.43 0.68 1.72 6.33 
HL Global 0.48 0.48 NA NA 0.85 NA 
Hotel Grand Central 4.50 4.53 0.14 0.35 44.57 2.75 
Hotel Properties 1.50 1.51 0.81 1.35 3.48 2.75 
Hotel Royal  0.50 0.50 0.11 0.33 10.79 4.50 
L.C. Development 1.71 1.71 0.22 0.72 -0.63 -4.27 
Mandarin Oriental 5.61 5.64 0.65 0.86 2.71 6.22 
OUE 10.66 10.67 0.26 0.35 -4.35 1.93 
Pan Pacific Hotels 0.90 0.93 0.14 0.35 11.18 1.66 
Stamford Land 1.03 1.04 0.48 0.93 1.37 1.02 
Industry Average 2.50 2.63 0.38 0.76 14.06 4.02 
Note: Data source from Thomson Reuters. 
   15
Negative effects. 
The main disadvantage of conservative financing policy is the missing of 
opportunities for hotel owners to maximize profits through financing leverage. 
During boom economy, hotel owners in Singapore may have missed the 
opportunity to accelerate growth by the adoption of conservative financing 
policy. The preference to raise capital through equity instead of debt means hotel 
owners in Singapore have to sacrifice part of the company’s ownership to 
outsiders, which might lead to possible loss of management control. Having low 
debt financing would also reduce the company’s return on equity, and investors 
with high-risk appetite would not view the company favorably. Hotel owners 
also missed the opportunity to increase profits when the values of the properties 
appreciated faster than the interest expenses of debts. In addition, hotel 
management may not be motivated to improve efficiency as low debt enable 
them to achieve earnings much easier, since they need not worry about the 
interest expenses that come with the debt. 
Positive effects. 
Hotel properties in Singapore have weathered well during recessions, due 
to conservative financing model adopted by most hotel owners in Singapore. In 
late 1990s recession, instead of being forced into bank foreclosures, a few hotels 
in Singapore were converted into luxury condominiums by the hotel owners or 
sold for redevelopment (Rahiwala, 2002). The only known hotels that 
encountered foreclosures were Katong Park Hotel in 1998 (Rahiwala, 1998); 
Asia Radio Hotel in 2002 (Tan, 2002); and Crown Hotel Orchard in 2005 (Jones 
Lang LaSalle Hotels, 2005). In the case of Crown Hotel Orchard, the failure of the 
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hotel was not due to over leveraging on the part of hotel business, but the failure 
of other businesses owned by the hotel owner. During the last financial crisis in 
2008, not a single hotel property in Singapore has reported insolvency or 
foreclosure. The phenomenon indicates that the strict financing policy has 
helped hotel owners in Singapore to ride through recessions and unexpected 
events such as epidemics and the global credit crunch.  
Financial institutions and mortgage investors prefer to lend money to 
companies with low debt to equity ratio because lower debt means higher 
probability for borrowers to repay loan. Generally, lenders are more willing to 
extend loans to hotel properties with low debt since hotel business incurs high 
capital investment. In addition, long-term investors prefer to invest in companies 
with strict financing policy, as the risk of insolvency is minimum. In terms of risk 
management, hotel owners in Singapore were in a better position to ride through 
the economic downturn and unforeseeable events that would negatively affect 
the economy. 
Cultural Implications. 
Although Singapore has inherited the British education system during the 
colonial period, the value systems of Singaporeans were influenced by their 
Chinese heritage and Confucian values. According to an article on Characteristic 
Traits of the Chinese People, Cheng (1946) suggested that the Chinese have the 
virtue of saving for rainy days. A country study in the United States reported that 
Singapore had the world’s highest savings rate of 42% of income (Lepoer, 1989). 
In 2009, Singapore’s Gross National Savings was reported to be 46% (Ministry of 
Trade and Development, 2009). The value of saving could be seen by the 
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conservative approach of Singapore business owners, where building company 
reserves and prudent spending were the guiding principles for business strategy. 
The risk management approach taken by Singapore hotel owners could be 
explained by the teaching of Confucius, “The superior man, when resting in 
safety, does not forget that danger may come. When in a state of security he does 
not forget the possibility of ruin. When all is orderly, he does not forget that 
disorder may come. Thus his person is not endangered, and his States and all 
their clans are preserved” (Confucius, n.d., p. 391). As such, accumulation of 
retained earnings, during economic upturns in preparation for potential 
downturns in the future, has been a business strategy for some hotel owners in 
Singapore. 
On the other hand, the great capitalism of the United States has a value 
system of using borrowed money to spend. Americans believed that it is wimped 
to save money (Associated Press, 2006). In 2006, two years before the financial 
crisis, the savings rate in the United States was in the negative region, meaning 
they had spent more than they had saved (Associated Press, 2006). The situation 
seems to get worse, as the savings rate in the United States dropped to almost 
negative four percent in 2010, the lowest ever recorded since the depression 
(Karlsson, 2010). The value system of using borrowed money for spending has 
influenced the business strategy practices of the hotel owners in the United 
States.  
Conclusion 
The insolvency rate of hotel properties in the United States was in great 
contrast with that of hotel properties in Singapore. The literature review has 
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shown that hotel owners in United States have excessively used debt financing 
for expansion, and high leverage approach has caused exceptionally high 
delinquency rates and foreclosures of hotel properties in the United States. The 
huge debt incurred during aggressive expansions coupled with decreasing room 
revenues caused by the recession would have reduced the hotels ability to 
generate enough cash flow to pay for its interest expenses. In the United States, 
hotel owners tend to borrow high level of debt, which explains why hotel owners 
seemed to be perpetually faced with financial woes. The benefits from debt 
financing have more than offset by the financial-distress costs.  
In Singapore, hotel property owners have adopted a more conservative 
financing policy. At a low level of debt, hotel owners in Singapore have the 
financial flexibility to make changes, and the chances of financial woes were slim.  
The positive effects from debt would surpass the financial cost, especially when 
the hotel properties enjoy high profitability. The literature review has shown 
that hotel properties with too much debt are at risk even for well-run hotels. 
According to Elgonemy (2002), a good balance between too much debt and too 
little debt needs to be attained. 
Cultural values may play a part in the types of financing model adopted by 
hotel owners in the United States and Singapore. The great capitalism of the 
United States has a value system of using borrowed money to spend and 
leverage, which partly explains why American hotel owners preferred aggressive 
financing model. On the other hand, the cultural values of Singaporeans were 
influenced by their Chinese heritage and Confucian values, where the virtue of 
saving and spending within one’s mean were inculcated in the minds of 
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Singaporeans. Therefore, cultural values may have partly influenced hotel 
owners in Singapore to adopt a more conservative financing model. 
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PART THREE 
Introduction  
Analysis and Methodology 
Methodology. 
According to a study by Beaver (1996) quoted in Gu and Gao (2000), there 
were five important financial ratios that could be used to predict bankruptcy of 
businesses, namely: cash flow to total debt; net income to total assets; total debt 
to total assets; working capital to total assets; and current ratio. The results of 
Beaver’s study indicated that ratio analysis was effective in providing warning 
signals on potential business failures five years before the actual event. 
Therefore, financial ratio analysis was used in this exploratory study to 
investigate the financing models of hotel properties in the United States and 
Singapore, and to determine the risk of insolvency during different business 
cycles.  
According to Youn and Gu (2009), the Artificial Neutral Network (ANN) 
model adopted by a study to predict business failures has shown that Interest 
Coverage ratio was the most important signal to predict business failures for the 
hotel business in Korea. It was found that interest coverage was correlated to 
solvency and profits of hotel properties, and the ratio could be used by hotel 
owners in Korea as a warning signal for potential financial failures (Youn & Gu, 
2009).  The importance of using Interest Coverage to identify insolvency risk 
associated with debt could be substantiated by another study conducted by 
Mammoser (2009). The Mammoser study simulated the correlation of RevPAR 
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on Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR), which found that a decline of 15% in 
RevPAR would decrease the DSCR from 1.40 to 0.91. The results support the 
view that during a recession, a reduction in RevPAR would drastically affect 
hotels’ ability to generate enough cash flow to service the debt. Mammoser study 
has proven the correlation between DSCR and insolvency.   
With reference to the studies by Beaver’s (1996) and Youn and Gu (2009), 
the following five financial ratios were selected for ratios analysis: Quick Ratio 
and Current Ratio that represent the liquidity of the hotel properties; Long-Term 
Debt to Equity (LTDE), Total Debt to Equity (TDE), and Interest Coverage that 
represent the solvency of the hotel properties. The financial data for both the 
United States and Singapore hotel industries were collected from Thomson 
Reuters websites. For Singapore hotel industry, only 2008 data was available at 
the time of research. The financial ratios for Singapore hotel industry were 
calculated based on the average of sixteen public hotel properties listed in the 
Singapore Stock Exchange (See Table 5). The final ratios for both the United 
States’ and Singapore’s hotel industries were compiled and tabulated in Table 1.  
Sampling Method. 
The historical data of hotel properties in Singapore were limited, and data 
such as debt and interest expenses were proprietary to properties’ owners. 
Therefore, Singapore public companies with substantial hotel businesses were 
selected as samples to represent the hotel industry in Singapore. In 2010, a total 
of sixteen hotel properties were listed in the Singapore Stock Exchange, and all 
were selected as samples for the research. As the latest financial data was not 
available at the time of research, 2008 data was used instead. The Singapore data 
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samples comprised of a balanced mix of four to five star hotels and resorts, 
which provided a good representation of the hotel industry in Singapore. The 
source of data was obtained from Thomson Reuters, and the average ratios of the 
sixteen Singapore hotel properties were calculated as shown in Table 5. 
For United States’ data samples, the financial ratios of hotel industry were 
collected from Reuters public website, which included hotels, motels, cruise lines 
industries that engaged in the operation of hotels, bed and breakfast inns, 
motels, cabins, cottages, youth hostels, cruise lines and other tourist and 
boarding lodges  (Reuters, 2010). A total of forty-four public companies we 
included in the US sample, which provided a good representation of the hotel 
industry in US.  
Ratio analysis. 
Refer to Table 6, the hotel properties in the United States were facing 
liquidity crunch while their counterparts in Singapore were operating under a 
healthy liquidity condition. The Quick Ratio provides a measurement of the 
company's ability to satisfy its short-term debt with its most liquid assets. The 
Quick Ratio of 0.78 means for every one-dollar of current debt, hotel properties 
in the United States only have $0.78 cash or cash equivalent, a shortfall of $0.22 
to fulfill its short-term debt obligation. Having a Quick Ratio of below one means 
hotels in the United States did not have sufficient cash or liquid assets to meet its 
short-term debt obligations. This was a warning sign that the hotel industry in 
the United States was facing a major liquidity crisis. Comparing its Current Ratio 
of 1.01 with Quick Ratio of 0.78, it showed that hotel properties in the United 
States might be holding too much inventories, or the inventories might not be 
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able to turn around fast enough to meet its short-term debt obligations. The Gu 
and Gao (2000) study suggested that unprofitable companies burdened with 
debt and short-term liabilities have higher probability of bankruptcy.  
Table 6   
Financing Strength of Hotel Industry in US and Singapore 
Gearing Ratio 
 
US Hotel 
2010 
April 7 
SG Hotel 
2008 
Dec 31 
S&P 500 
2010 
April 7 
Quick Ratio 0.78 2.50 0.81 
Current Ratio 1.01 2.63 0.97 
LT Debt to Equity 57.30 0.38 141.48 
Total Debt to Equity 77.52 0.76 202.73 
Interest Coverage 0.64 14.06 10.33 
Note: Data source from http://www.reuters.com and Thomson Reuters. 
 
In contrast with hotel properties in the United States, Singapore hotels 
were holding excessive cash or cash equivalent, which have a Quick Ratio of 2.50 
and Current Ratio of 2.63 (See Table 6). That means for every one-dollar of 
current liability, hotels in Singapore have 2.5 dollars of cash or cash equivalent. 
The small gap between the Quick Ratio and Current Ratio showed that hotels in 
Singapore were holding lesser inventories and prepayment, or inventories could 
be turned around quickly into cash. Although the findings suggested that hotel 
properties in Singapore were less likely to go into bankruptcy due to debt, the 
large amount of cash holding did not reflect well on its management efficiency, as 
the liquid asset could be freed up for better use. Generally, the benchmark for 
Current Ratio is 1.5 for most industries (Cunningham, 1962, p. 121). Depending 
on the types of industries, a Quick Ratio of one is considered risky, as the hotel 
properties marginally met its short-term liabilities. A Quick Ratio of below one is 
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a warning sign that the hotel cannot meet its short-term debt obligations, and the 
potential of bankruptcy is high (Gu & Gao, 2000). 
The Debt to Equity Ratio of hotel properties in the United States was 77.52 
(See Table 6), which means for every one dollar of equity, the hotel had $77.52 of 
debt to match it. Hence, for every $78.52 of asset, hotel properties in United 
States had $77.52 of debt, which translated to a Debt Ratio of 98.73%. If only 
long-term debt was considered, the Long-Term Debt to Equity Ratio of 57.30 
means hotel properties in United States had a Long-Term Debt Ratio of 98.28%. 
The findings showed that the amount of debt used to finance hotel properties in 
the United States was exceptionally large compared to equity, which could be 
very risky during economic volatility. Hotel properties with large amount of debt 
would face the risk of insolvency and financial rigidness (Elgonemy, 2002). The 
negative effect of high debt financing could be seen by the burden to pay interest 
expenses during down economy. The Interest Coverage of 0.64 means for every 
one-dollar of interest expense, hotel properties in the United States only make 
$0.64 to cover. The shortfall of $0.36 for every one-dollar of debt made the hotel 
properties in the United States vulnerable to bankruptcy. According to Youn and 
Gu (2009) study, Interest Coverage is correlated to insolvency risk associated 
with debt. The high debt financing combined with low interest coverage had 
provided a perfect storm for hotel properties in the United States to fall into 
bankruptcy.   
In contrast to the hotel industry in the United States, hotel owners in 
Singapore had a Total Debt to Equity Ratio of 0.76 and Interest Coverage of 14.06 
(See Table 6). That means for every one-dollar of equity, hotel properties in 
Singapore had $0.76 of debt to match it. Hence, for every $1.76 of asset, $0.76 
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was financed by debt, which translated to a Debt Ratio of 43.18%. If only long-
term debt was considered, the Long-Term Debt to Equity Ratio of 0.38 mean 
hotel properties in Singapore had a long-term debt ratio of only 27.54%. This 
was in great contrast with hotel properties in the United States, which had a Debt 
Ratio of astonishing 98.73%, and a long-term debt ratio of 98.28%. In addition, 
hotel properties in Singapore had an Interest Coverage of 14.06, which mean for 
every one-dollar of interest expenses, the hotel had $14.06 of income, more than 
sufficient to cover its interest expenses. According to Bongini, Ferri and Hahm 
(2000) quoted in Youn and Gu (2000), companies that were less likely to fail 
typically have larger profits, lower debts, and higher Interest Coverage. The 
findings suggested that hotel owners in Singapore had adopted conservative 
financing model, which weathered them through the economic downturn.  
Risk management 
In order to determine the effectiveness of different financing models in a 
given environment, a good understanding of risk management associated with 
debt financing is critical. Financial risk is risk associated with insolvency due to 
the use of debt (Investopedia, 2010). According to Elgonemy (2002), there were 
four major factors that influenced debt financing, namely: business risk; risk 
aversion of owners; financial flexibility; and tax implication. Business risk is 
affected by seasonal fluctuations of the hotel business; exchange rate; and 
competition. Business risk is also affected by cost structures of hotel properties, 
such as the proportion of variable cost versus fixed cost. In general, business risk 
of the hotel industry is greatly influenced by economic cycles, which affect room 
revenues due to volatility of tourists and business travelers’ arrivals. In a high 
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business-risk environment, one way to manage business risk is to adopt a more 
conservative capital structure, such as higher equity and lower debt financing.  
Hotel owners with high risk-aversion would typically adopt more 
conservative financing models and enjoy the highest financial flexibility during 
market volatility. The pitfall of high risk-aversion is the missed opportunity to 
grow the hotel properties by financial leverage. On the contrary, low risk-
aversion owners tend to adopt aggressive financing model with the intention to 
accelerate growth and maximize returns on equity. Therefore, a good balance 
between too much debt and too little debt needs to be attained. 
Financial flexibility influences the ability of property owners to take 
financial risks. Hotel owners who incurred large amount of debts are obligated to 
pay high interest coverage regardless of hotel profitability, and loss the financial 
flexibility by enslaving themselves to the lenders. As such, lenders who had 
underestimated the financial risks of hotel borrowers would affect the hotel debt 
to equity ratio; thereby increased the borrowers’ risk of insolvency and 
foreclosure. On the other hand, hotel owners who preferred financial flexibility 
tend to borrow less and preferred to raise capital through equity. During an 
economic crisis or a recession, the provision of financial flexibility would allow 
hotel owners to make changes and increase cash flow to cushion the impact of 
the down economy.  
The last factor that influences debt financing is taxation. Generally, 
interests paid to lenders were tax deductible for debt capital, whereas dividends 
paid to equity holders were not tax deductible. As a result, in a high tax 
environment, hotel owners were more motivated to raise capital through debt 
instead of equity. In a failed economy, tax deductible on interest was useless if 
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the hotel was making a loss. The risk of insolvency would be high if hotels were 
not able to generate enough cash flow to cover the interest expenses.    
Who should adopt aggressive financing model? 
Refer to the findings of ratios analysis and risk management, aggressive 
financing model should only be adopted when the following two conditions have 
been fulfilled: the economy is in the early stage of upswing; and hotel property is 
increasingly enjoying high profitability. Under such an environment, the positive 
effects from debt would surpass the financial cost, especially when the hotel 
properties enjoy high profitability. However, hotels that adopt the aggressive 
financing model during an economic upturn have to keep watch of Quick Ratio 
and Interest Coverage to avoid potential pitfalls caused by unexpected events. 
Generally, in a stable environment, a Quick Ratio of one was sufficient to 
ensure liquidity of the hotel properties, as the current liability would be perfectly 
covered by cash or liquid assets. However, in an imperfect environment, a Quick 
Ratio of more than one is necessary for risk management purposes. As the hotel 
business is a high-risk industry, profitability can be adversely affected by 
external events, even in a boom economy situation. Therefore, a Quick Ratio of at 
least 1.5 must be maintained at all times (Cunningham, 1962, p. 121).  
The question of the ideal Interest Coverage ratio during different economic 
cycles was debatable, as any deviation in room revenues could drastically affect 
the hotel’s profitability, due to the nature of high fixed cost in the hotel business. 
From the risk management perspective, a large cushion of Interest Coverage was 
needed to prepare any unexpected external events that might adversely affect 
the hotel revenue, even during economic upswings. With reference to the 
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Singapore hotel industry, the Interest Coverage of 14.06 during the economic 
downturn had provided an exceptionally large safety net for hotel owners in 
Singapore, as zero bankruptcy was evident during the last recession. On the 
contrary, a low Interest Coverage of 0.64 saw large number of hotel bankruptcy 
cases in the United States. Therefore, during economic upturns, hotel properties 
should maintain a minimum Interest Coverage of two to provide a safety cushion 
for any potential impact on revenues caused by unexpected events. 
Who should adopt conservative financing model? 
According to Juglar quoted in Greene (1916), the time to shingle a house is 
when it is not raining; and the time to consider panic is the time of 
unprecedented prosperity. Juglar’s study on the fluctuation of interest rates and 
prices during 1860s found that the business cycle was approximately nine to 
eleven years (Juglar, n.d.). Juglar had also determined four stages waves, namely 
prosperity, crisis, liquidation and recession. As such, conservative financing 
model could be adopted when the economy is at the late stage of prosperity. 
When that happened, hotel properties need to restructure its capitalization by 
reducing debt and increasing equity. The recapitalization strategy would help to 
increase Interest Coverage of hotel properties, and provide larger cushion for a 
possible economic downturn.  
Results 
Refer to the computed data as shown in Table 6 and Table 7 hotel owners 
in the United States adopted the high debt financing model for rapid growth 
while their counterparts in Singapore adopted the conservative financing model 
for slower and stable growth. During the recession, the Quick Ratio and Interest 
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Coverage of hotel properties in the United States declined to below one, which 
had resulted in a relatively high rate of bankruptcy in the hotel industry. On the 
contrary, the Quick Ratio and Interest Coverage for hotel properties in Singapore 
were exceptionally high, which provided a large safety cushion for economic 
volatility, and contributed to zero rate of bankruptcy during the last recession. 
The results of the study suggested that during economic upturns, hotel owners 
should take on appropriate level of debt financing to improve returns on equity 
and to accelerate growth; but revert to a conservative financing model during 
economic downturns to reduce risk of bankruptcy due to debt. The right 
financing model for hotel properties was developed as shown in Figure 1.  
Table 7 
2008 Gearing Ratios and ROE of Hotel Industry in Singapore 
Hotel QR CR LTDE TDTE IC ROE 
Amara 1.47 1.48 0.89 1.46 3.42 6.80 
Banyan Tree 1.19 1.25 0.47 1.64 2.84 1.25 
Bonvests 2.09 2.22 0.00 0.27 72.50 7.82 
CDL 1.12 2.86 0.61 1.31 6.26 10.69 
Furama 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.12 70.50 14.88 
Genting 4.54 4.55 0.50 0.72 -2.28 -4.07 
Gluoculeisure 1.76 1.76 0.43 0.68 1.72 6.33 
HL Global 0.48 0.48 NA NA 0.85 NA 
Hotel Grand Central 4.50 4.53 0.14 0.35 44.57 2.75 
Hotel Properties 1.50 1.51 0.81 1.35 3.48 2.75 
Hotel Royal  0.50 0.50 0.11 0.33 10.79 4.50 
L.C. Development 1.71 1.71 0.22 0.72 -0.63 -4.27 
Mandarin Oriental 5.61 5.64 0.65 0.86 2.71 6.22 
OUE 10.66 10.67 0.26 0.35 -4.35 1.93 
Pan Pacific Hotels 0.90 0.93 0.14 0.35 11.18 1.66 
Stamford Land 1.03 1.04 0.48 0.93 1.37 1.02 
Industry Average 2.50 2.63 0.38 0.76 14.06 4.02 
Note: Data source from Thomson Reuters. 
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Figure 1.  Financing model for hotel properties: Ideal financing model.  
Note: The financing model was developed based on 2010 study of financial implications on hotel 
industries in United States and Singapore. 
 
The horizontal axis in Figure 1 represents the types of financing models, 
while the vertical axis represents the economic conditions. The right side of the 
vertical axis represents the intensity of aggressive financing approach while the 
left side represents the intensity of conservative financing approach. The upper 
part of the horizontal axis represents the intensity of economic upturn while the 
lower part represents the intensity of economic downturn. Hotel owners who 
adopted the aggressive financing approach during the economic downturn 
would fall into the Bankruptcy Zone, which means high probability of 
bankruptcy due to insolvency. The results of the study have shown that hotel 
properties in the United States fell into the Bankruptcy Zone during the 
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economic downturn and Danger Zone during the economic upturn (See Figure 
2).  
 
Figure 2.  Financing model for United States hotel properties.  
Note: The financing model was developed based on 2010 study of financial implications on hotel 
industries in United States and Singapore. 
 
On the contrary, hotel owners who adopted conservative financing 
approach during the economic upturn would fall into Inefficiency Zone, which 
means the hotel owners were inefficient in managing their assets. The results of 
the study have shown that hotel properties in Singapore fell into Low Growth 
Zones during the economic upturn and downturn (See Figure 3). The study 
found that the ideal financing model for hotel properties would be along the 
dotted line as shown in Figure 1, which indicates the appropriate levels of debt 
financing during economic upturn and downturn. Hotel properties that adopted 
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financing model along the dotted line would enjoy the leverage effect of debt 
financing during economic upturns and weather against bankruptcy due to debt 
financing when the economic downturn hits the industry (See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 3: Financing model for Singapore hotel properties.  
Note: The financing model was developed based on 2010 study of financial implications on hotel 
industries in United States and Singapore. 
The right financing model for hotel owners in United States. 
The right financing approach for hotel owners in the United States would 
be to moderate their overly aggressive debt financing model during an economic 
upswing, and to implement a conservative financing policy when the economy 
achieves unprecedented prosperity, which may signal the ending stage of the 
economic boom (Juglar, n.d.). The proposed financial model would allow hotel 
owners to ride on the bull economy for growth by leveraging on debt financing, 
taking into consideration risk management to cushion potential unexpected 
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events. By reverting to a conservative financing policy near the peak of economic 
upturn, hotel owners would be in better positions to sail through the recession. 
The ideal financing model for hotel properties in the United States is shown in 
Figure 1. 
The right financing model for hotel owners in Singapore. 
Hotel owners in Singapore should moderately loosen up the overly 
conservative financing approach, and implement a more aggressive financing 
approach during economic upswings. By adapting different financing models 
according to different stages of the business cycle, and using Quick Ratio, Debt 
Ratio and Interest Coverage as indicators for the purpose of risk management, 
hotel properties in Singapore would be able to leverage on debt for growth 
during economic upturns, and revert to a conservative financing approach 
during recessions. The ideal financing model for hotel properties in Singapore is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Paper Limitations 
Due to limited data of the Singapore hotel industry, the financial ratios for 
Singapore hotel industry were based on December 31, 2008 data collected from 
Thomson Reuters whereas the United States were based on April 7, 2010 data 
from Thomson Reuters. Despite the time gap between the two hotel industries, 
the comparison was acceptable since both were experiencing a similar type of 
recession due to the credit crisis.  
The proposed financing model (See Figure 1) was based on the context of 
hotel properties in the United States and Singapore.  As such, the financing model 
may not be applicable to other industries where the environment conditions, 
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product characteristics and cost structures were distinctive for the United States 
and Singapore.  The study assumed that the business cycle behaviors defined by 
Juglar (n.d.) was still relevant. The paper also assumed both hotel owners in the 
United States and Singapore had similar accessibility to the credit market, and 
were subjected to similar costs of financing, interest rates and equity market, 
which would otherwise affect the proposed financing model.  
Many hotel properties in the United States have debt financings that were 
tied to complex commercial-mortgage backed securities fund owned by many 
mortgage investors. As such, hotel properties in the United States might face 
challenges in capital restructuring as recommended by the proposed financing 
model. Hotel property owners should minimize involvement in such complex 
commercial-mortgage backed securities fund that would restrict their financial 
flexibility during economic volatility. 
Financial and Managerial Implications and Recommendations 
The American value system of using borrowed money to spend and 
leverage seems to work against the fundamental principle of risk management. 
The aggressive debt-financing model adopted by hotel owners in the United 
States had consistently contributed to a relatively large number of hotel 
foreclosures during the economic downturn. During economic upturns, when 
businesses were enjoying high profitability, adopting high debt financing for 
growth seemed to be working well for hotel owners in the United States. 
However, history has proven repeatedly that during a recession, a relatively 
large number of hotels in the United States went bankrupt due to a large amount 
of debt. Therefore, hotel owners in the United States need to manage its financial 
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risk by keeping an appropriate level of Quick Ratio (e.g. above 1.5) and Interest 
Coverage (e.g. above 2.0).  
When the economy reaches unprecedented prosperity, which may signal 
the end stage of the economic boom (Juglar, n.d.), hotel owners could implement 
a recapitalization exercise to further increase the Quick Ratio and Interest 
Coverage in preparation for a potential economic downturn. In addition to the 
recapitalization program, hotel properties need to reduce operating cost if a 
recession occurs. However, cost reduction strategy would not be discussed in 
this paper, as it was not the objective of this study. Raising hotel equity could 
increase its cash holding and reduce its debt financing, thereby reduce the hotel 
risk of falling into bankruptcy if the economy did go into recession. For example, 
Fairmont Raffles has recently turned to equity market for recapitalization, selling 
40% of the company to partially repay its debt (Mazurkewich, 2010).  
Singaporeans have a value system of saving for rainy days, and the 
influence of Confucianism was apparent in the conservative financing approach 
adopted by hotel owners in Singapore. Although the conservative financing 
model helped hotel properties in Singapore to weather economic downturns, 
they had also missed the opportunity to leverage on debt for growth. An ideal 
financing approach would be a good balance of debt and equity during different 
economic cycles. Hence, hotel properties in Singapore need to improve its 
efficiency by redeploying their excessive cash and cash equivalents for better 
yield. This could be done by moderating their Quick Ratio from a high of 2.50 in 
2008 (See Table 1), keeping in mind not to breach below 1.5 for the purpose of 
risk management. The high Interest Coverage of 14.06 (See Table 6) for hotel 
properties in Singapore had provided a large margin for hotel owners in 
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Singapore to take on more financial risks. When hotels are experiencing high 
profitability, debt financing has the leverage effect of increasing the ROE for 
hotel property investment (See Table 8).   
Table 8 
Effect of Debt Financing on ROE 
 Without Leverage With 70% Leverage 
Equity contributions $100,000,000 $30,000,000 
Total revenues $30,000,000 $30,000,000 
Total fixed and operating expenses $20,000,000 $20,000,000 
Interest expenses 0 $5,250,000 
Net income to owner $10,000,000 $4,750,000 
Return on Equity (ROE) 10% 15.8% 
Note: Assume interest rate 7.5% per year. 
 
The results of the study suggested that hotel owners in the United States 
and Singapore should adopt the right financing model as shown in Figure 1.  The 
proposed financing model would allow hotel properties to take on an 
appropriate level of debt to accelerate growth and to improve ROE during 
economic upturns; and revert to the conservative financing model during 
economic downturns, so as to reduce the risk of bankruptcy due to debt.  
Conclusion 
The study has shown that high debt-financing model adopted by hotel 
owners in the United States contributed to a relatively large number of 
foreclosures during the economic downturn. On the other hand, the conservative 
financing model adopted by hotel owners in Singapore had weathered them 
through the last recession. During the economic upturn, hotel owners in the 
United States grew exponentially by aggressively acquiring properties through 
debt financing, while their counterparts in Singapore maintained the 
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conservative financing model and missed the growth opportunities. The study 
concluded that an appropriate level of debt financing during an economic upturn 
will accelerate the growth of the hotel business and has the leverage effect of 
increasing returns on equity. By adopting the proposed financing model as 
shown in Figure 1, hotel owners in the United States and Singapore would be 
able to ride on the bull economy for growth, and remain solvent during 
recessions.  
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